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A B S T R A C T
The COP24 meeting in Katowice, Poland, made clear the divisions between the winners and losers of a low-
carbon energy transition. The IPCC's 1.5 °C report shows that climate change mitigation must see an early peak in
oil demand and a rapid fall in consumption thereafter. The ‘shale revolution’ and the falling cost and rapid
deployment of renewable energy are laying the foundations of a ‘new oil order’ that threatens the prosperity of
oil exporting economies. A review of forecasts and scenarios reveals significant uncertainty surrounding the
dynamics of future oil demand. This provides the backdrop for a comparative analysis of the world's largest oil
exporters: Saudi Arabia and Russia. Saudi Arabia is shown to be concerned to maintain oil revenues to finance its
‘2030 vision’ to diversify its economy. Russia, by comparison, shows no such ambition, rather it seems de-
termined to increase its reliance on the oil and gas sectors. The conclusions suggest that fossil fuel exporters must
act now to prepare for the low carbon transition and that a failure to do so could result in tensions and conflicts
that could undermine the collective action required to address climate change.
1. Introduction
At the COP24 meeting in Katowice in December 2018 clear fault
lines emerged between the potential winners and loser of the low-
carbon energy transition. A coalition of major fossil fuel producers—the
United States, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—refused to support a
motion to ‘welcome’ the IPCC's report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C [1].
Because unanimous approval was required, the meeting was only able
to ‘note’ the report. Although it may be ‘welcomed’ at the later date, this
action caused great upset amongst many present at the meetings.1 At
the same meeting Saudi Arabia's Minister of Energy, Industry and Mi-
neral Resources Khalid Al-Falih [2] made a statement criticizing the
tone of the meeting in relation to the intent of the 2015 Paris Agree-
ment: ‘The basis of the Agreement was an intent to strengthen global
action on climate change without sacrificing sustainable development
and poverty eradication. That was to be achieved through a focus on
reducing emissions rather than banning or restricting energy sources,
such as fossil fuels …. we are seeing undue emphasis on energy and
particularly oil …. ’ In a similar vein, the US National Statement made
clear their position: ‘The global climate conversation needs to embrace
not only aspiration but today's reality. The U.S. approach incorporates
the realities of the global energy mix and uses all energy sources and
technologies as cleanly and efficiently as possible, including fossil fuels,
nuclear energy and renewable energy’ [3]. The US delegation held an
event promoting fossil fuels at which Donald Trump's international
energy and climate adviser, Wells Griffith, said: ‘The United States has
an abundance of natural resources and is not going to keep them in the
ground. We strongly believe that no country should have to sacrifice
their economic prosperity or energy security in pursuit of environ-
mental sustainability.’ Not surprisingly, it was reported that this posi-
tion ’brought scorn from environmentalists and countries that support
stronger action to fight global warming.2 However, the US position does
reflect the reality that the world's largest fossil fuel ‘producer econo-
mies’ are waking up to the fact that effective climate change mitigation
threatens their prosperity and the influence that they are currently af-
forded [4].
Whether welcomed or not, the IPCC's report made clear the scale of
the challenge facing humanity if it is to avoid ‘catastrophic climate
change’. It documented that 2 °C warming by the end of this Century
would bring with it significant damage to the global economy, human
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health and well-being and the natural environment. However, the
pathway to 1.5 °C is daunting and would require a rapid reduction of
our reliance on fossil fuels. In October 2018, the International Energy
Agency [5] published a study on ‘Outlook for Producer Economies 2018:
What do changing energy dynamics mean for major oil and gas exporters?’
The study is based on the proposition that ‘a changing energy system is
posing critical questions for many of the world's largest oil and gas
producers’ and that ‘more than at any point in recent history, funda-
mental changes to the development model in resource-rich economies
look unavoidable.’ The so-called ‘producer economies’ are a hetero-
genous group and some are much more able and committed to making
the changes needed to diversify their economies and prepare for a fu-
ture reduction in the ‘resource rents’ that they have relied upon.
Despite the warnings of the IPCC report and the campaigns to ‘leave
it in the ground’ and ‘divest’ from fossil fuels, the reality is that the
transition to a low carbon energy system will take time. Just how long is
one of the critical uncertainties, but already, we argue, the oil order is
changing and unless managed this ‘high-carbon’ transition will become
a significant source of geopolitical instability. This is made clear in
IRENA's [6] report on ‘The Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation.’3
Although the report focuses on the benefits of an accelerated deploy-
ment of renewable energy technologies, it also considers the impact of
such a future on the fossil fuel producer economies. A new lexicon is
apparent in such discussions that no longer focus on fossil fuel scarcity,
but instead talk of ‘carbon budgets,’ ‘unburnable carbon,’ ‘peak de-
mand,’ ‘stranded assets,’ and ‘lock-in.’ At the same time, as the IRENA
report documents, the growth of renewable energy is posing new geo-
political challenges around, for example, critical raw materials, grid
interconnection and control of clean-technologies [7].
This paper builds on our work elsewhere that makes the case that
changes are underway that are laying the foundations for a ‘new oil
order,’ in the sense that the shale revolution has granted the US a new
position in global oil and gas markets, at the expense of the relative
position of OPEC; and that the falling cost and growth of low carbon
energy sources and the emphasis on decarbonisation mean the con-
tinued dominance on fossil fuels, perhaps sooner than later, will be
challenged [8,9]. The next section briefly outlines the contours of our
argument and analyses a range of current views on the future role of
fossil fuels in the global energy mix. The rest of the paper then presents
a preliminary analysis of the preparedness, or not, of the world's two
largest fossil fuel exporters—Saudi Arabia and Russia—to address the
challenges that they may face as a result of the new oil order. After a
comparison of the status of the two countries as ‘producer economies,’
the two case studies focus on how they have responded to the recent
turmoil in the global oil market and whether or not they are seeking to
adjust their ‘economic model’ to prospects of a ‘world after oil.’
Why does this matter? The history of these two economies reveals
their vulnerability to prolonged periods of low oil prices and oil price
volatility. For example, high oil prices in the late 1970s supported a
failing economic system, but the fall in the oil price in the 1980s played
a major part in the collapse of the Soviet Union. More recently, the rise
in the oil price in the first decade of this century played a crucial role in
consolidating President Putin's authority and that of the Russian state.
In Saudi Arabia, the availability of significant oil rents is crucial to
maintaining the social contract between the ruling elite and the coun-
try's growing and youthful population and significant financial reserves
are needed when it is called on to cut production when oil prices are
low. Recently, it is only cooperation between Russia and Saudi Arabia
that has allowed OPEC to seek to re-balance the international oil
market. Thus, the preparedness of these two economies for a world with
a lower demand for oil and gas, and hence lower prices, has profound
geopolitical consequences, both in terms of internal social and political
cohesion and also foreign policy and international relations. The two
cases are also reflective of the wider challenges that all fossil-fuel ex-
porting countries will have to face in the medium-to long-term as the
energy transition proceeds, and possibly, accelerates. The paper con-
cludes by considering the wider geopolitical implications of our ana-
lysis as a component of the wider geopolitics of the energy transfor-
mation.
2. The new oil order
In recent years two fundamental developments have challenged the
existing logic of the international oil market that is based on notions of
scarcity and a delicate balance between supply and demand: the so-
called ‘shale revolution’, and the rapid fall in the cost and growth in the
deployment of renewable power generation—solar power and wind
turbines. Together, these developments represent countervailing ten-
dencies. On the one hand, the shale revolution has heralded an era of
‘fossil fuel abundance; ’ on the other hand, the rapid growth of re-
newable power generation is challenging the role of fossil fuels in the
energy mix—particularly coal and gas—and making possible an elec-
trification pathway to low carbon transportation that will impact on oil
demand [10,11]. Here we focus on the causes of the recent volatility in
the global oil market and the prospects for future demand [12].
2.1. Fossil fuel abundance
At the turn of the century, the US was preparing to become a major
importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG). However, most of the import
terminals that were built were never used and many are now being
converted into export facilities as the US has become an LNG exporter
[13]. The technologies that have enabled the shale gas revolution have
also been applied to tight oil (oil produced from shale using horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing) with the same dramatic consequences
and the US has reduced its reliance on imported oil, the ban on crude oil
exports has been lifted, and the economy is now enjoying an industrial
renaissance [14]. So far, these developments have been limited to North
America—similar developments have taken place in Western Cana-
da—but there is the potential for them to be applied elsewhere in the
world [15]. Nonetheless, the shale revolution has already had sig-
nificant impacts on global oil and gas markets and geopolitics [16].
Since late 2015, when the ban on crude oil exports was lifted, the
emergence of the US as an oil exporter and the loss of its domestic
market to oil exporters, coupled with fragile oil demand growth, has
contributed to the over-supply and falling prices. As we document later,
this has led OPEC and Russia (OPEC +) to cooperate to try to balance
the market by constricting supply [17]. This has met with some success,
but there is now a school of thought that the availability of US light-
tight oil is imposing a price-corridor on the market around the $50-$60
a barrel level.4 While OPEC+ have demonstrated solidarity in reducing
output, the US oil industry has responded by improving efficiency and
reducing costs making more oil available at a lower price. Production in
most OPEC counties is controlled by large national oil companies
(NOC). This is not the case in North America where private companies
of varying sizes operate in competition with one another and respond to
market conditions. Thus, when OPEC's actions succeed in pushing up
the price beyond $60 a barrel it only incentivizes US companies to in-
crease production. At the same time, the post-2014 fall in the oil price
forced greater cost discipline on conventional oil producers, and tech-
nological innovation and the benefits of digitization mean that there is
the prospect of more lower cost conventional oil than was once as-
sumed. It is not that long ago that the oil companies talked about ‘the
end of easy oil’ and the need for $100 a barrel to ensure adequate
supply. That is not to say that ‘geopolitical events’ might not result in
3 Thijs Van de Graaf is one of the lead authors of this report.
4 ‘Oil's ‘lower for longer’ reasserts itself.’ Financial Times, 23 November 2018:
https://www.ft.com/content/507b6dce-ed75-11e8-89c8-d36339d835c0.
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the occasional short-term spike in the oil price; but the cost supply
curves do reveal that a lot of oil can be produced around the $60,
though there are complications over the grade of that oil as the market
is now over-supplied with lighter grade oil and there is a shortage of
heavier grades, compounded by the current crisis in Venezuela [18].
2.2. A world of ‘radical uncertainty’
Despite regular interruptions by geopolitical factors—such as con-
flict in producing states or the imposition of sanctions—the oil market
tends to conform to the laws of supply and demand. Over-supply results
in falling price, while surging demand results in higher prices because it
takes time to bring on new production. All too often, new supply comes
on line as demand falters, and supply control is required to balance the
market, hence the boom and bust cycles [19]. At the moment, there are
growing concerns about the robustness of future oil demand prompted
by the prospects of slower economic growth as a result of the US-China
trade war and the re-balancing of the Chinese economy away from
heavy industry and towards the service sector and the knowledge
economy.5 However, there are clear signs that oil producers are be-
coming concerned about the longer-term prospects for global oil de-
mand because of increased movement toward action on climate change
mitigation, witness the statement by Saudi Arabia at COP24. In fact,
shareholders in many of the world's largest companies are forcing them
to make formal statements about their long-term prospects, while some
are seeking to diversify beyond oil and gas, the majority are focussing
on the cost competitiveness of their oil and gas production.
The oil and gas industry have long engaged in forecasting and sce-
nario planning, as have international organisations such as the IEA. In
the past these exercises were used to warn of impending shortfalls,
providing justification for tax breaks and billion-dollar investments. The
climate change community also uses complex energy and climate models
to demonstrate the radical changes needed to deliver the required re-
duction in carbon emissions to limit global warming. The IPCC's 1.5 °C
report presents four such scenarios with varying degrees of peak and
decline.6 For understandable reasons, there is a clear mismatch between
the more long-term and gradual decline in fossil fuel demand envisaged
by the likes of the IEA and the international oil companies and the ne-
cessity of rapid declines documented by the UNDP's (2018) ‘Gap Ana-
lysis’ [20] and by NGOs like Oil Change International [21] and Carbon
Tracker [22]. As we are currently on a pathway to at least 3 °C of
warming with little sign of the necessary actions required to rapidly
constrain emissions, the sobering reality is that the most likely outcome
is somewhere between the two, a rate of decline that will pose significant
challenges to the fossil fuel producer economies, but too slow to limit
warming to 1.5 °C, and—as noted above—the IPCC report makes clear a
2 °C world is one with significant challenges.
As Table 1 illustrates, there is some degree of consensus among the
IEA [23] and the international oil companies [24–27] as to a possible
range of oil demand trajectories, but no consensus on what is most
likely to happen. Rather, as the Head of Shell's Scenarios Team, Jeremy
Bentham, has put it, the industry faces ‘radical uncertainty.’7 As Table 1
makes clear, there is a tendency to develop three possible pathways:
first, a reference case that is ‘business as usual’ that results in continued
demand growth through to 2040; but most—with the exception of
ExxonMobil—do not believe that this will happen. Second, a gradual
reform case—the IEA's ‘current policies’ scenario—that assumes that
the current commitments under the Paris Agreement will be achieved
but makes not assumptions beyond that. Third, a reform case whereby
international cooperation and commitments lead to the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions in line with the 2 °C world (nobody is
thinking about 1.5 °C yet). This is the IEA's ‘Sustainable Development
Scenario’, Shell's ‘Sky’ scenario that achieves net-zero emissions by
2100, Equinor's ‘Renewal Scenario,’ and BP's ‘Even Faster Transition.’
Not surprisingly, these efforts are critiqued by academics [28] and
NGOs [29,30] alike, largely on the basis that their underlying as-
sumptions about the rate of growth in low carbon alternative are far too
conservative. While there is a consensus about the key fault lines or
uncertainties that will shape the pace of transition, as noted earlier,
there is no agreement on just how quickly things might change,
something that academics cannot agree on either [31]. As Equinor ex-
plain in their Energy Perspective 2018: ‘Oil demand by 2050 is highly
uncertain, with scenarios ranging from almost 60 million barrels a day
(mb/d) (Renewal) to around 120mb/d (Rivalry). Among the un-
certainty drivers the pace of electrification in transport and in other
sectors, the pace of efficiency development and the scope of different
macroeconomic and behavioural pathways stand out.’
In sum, there are large uncertainties surrounding the future demand for
oil and gas. The world is not currently on a path that will constrain global
warming to manageable levels. The critical issue is the pace at which the
energy system can decarbonise, but here the only consensus is the fact that
the current rate of change is too slow to mitigate climate change.
2.3. Peak oil demand
Of late there has been an increasing interest in the timing of ‘peak
global oil demand,’ as opposed to ‘peak oil supply’, which is a long-
standing issue. The OECD's oil demand peaked in 2005 and many of the
world's largest oil consumers have since peaked or are now experien-
cing slowing in demand. Table 1 presents varying views on the timing
of ‘peak oil demand,’ there are some that see it coming in the 2020s and
others in the 2030s, the latter includes the energy consulting company
Wood MacKenzie8 who see oil demand flatlining from 2030 and
peaking by 2036. Again, ExxonMobil is the outlier assuming that it
won't have peaked by 2040. In a recent influential discussion, Dale and
Fattouh argue that it is not the timing of peak oil that matters, rather:
‘the importance of ‘peak oil demand’ is that it signals a break from the
paradigm that has dominated oil markets over the past decades.’ That
paradigm is that oil producing economies rationed their oil supplies in
the belief that a barrel not produced today would be worth more when
produced in the future [32]. They suggest that ‘peak oil demand’ signals
an age of abundance with significant implications for the future price of
oil and the competitiveness of the oil market. Put simply, they foresee a
future of lower oil prices where only the most cost-competitive oil will
be produced, notwithstanding the impact of geopolitics. However, Dale
and Fattouh are firmly in the camp that ‘post peak’ oil consumption is
unlikely to fall sharply; the world will still need a lot of oil.
The cumulative consequence of the recent changes and growing
uncertainties discussed above is that world is now facing an emerging
new oil order, based on abundance, not scarcity, that is facing the
prospect of a peak in global demand during the next decade or so, and
huge uncertainty over the likely trajectory thereafter. Possibly, as
Shell's Chief Executive Officer, Ben van Beurden, described, a world of
‘lower forever’ oil prices,9 with obvious implications for the industry5 Amy M. Jaffe, U.S.-China trade issues loom large for oil, Energy Realpolitik,
Council for Foreign Economic Relations, 15 January 2019: https://www.cfr.
org/blog/us-china-trade-issues-loom-large-oil (accessed 10 May 2019).
6 An infogram of these scenarios can be found at: https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/
graphics/and an interactive model of them can be accessed at: https://data.ene.
iiasa.ac.at/iamc-1.5c-explorer/#/workspaces.
7 ‘Inside Oil Giant Shell's Race to Remake Itself for a Low-Price World,’
Fortune, 24 January 2018: http://fortune.com/2018/01/24/royal-dutch-shell-
lower-oil-prices/.
8 ‘Now near 100 million bpd, when will oil demand peak?’ Reuters, 20
September 2018: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-demand-peak/now-
near-100-million-bpd-when-will-oil-demand-peak-idUSKCN1M01TC.
9 Shell braces for ‘lower forever’ as profits soar,’ Reuters, 27 July 2017:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-shell-results/shell-braces-for-lower-
forever-oil-as-profits-soar-idUSKBN1AC0LO.
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and for oil exporting states [33].
3. The status of Saudi Arabia and Russia as producer economies
In following section, we examine how two major oil exporters,
Saudi Arabia and Russia, were affected by the post-2014 downturn in
global oil prices, and how they have responded since. The recent lower
oil price environment shows how vulnerable both countries are to ad-
verse shocks to their oil revenues. Our focus on Russia and Saudi Arabia
is justified as they are currently the two largest oil exporters in the
world. Although the US has now surpassed them in total production, its
exports remain modest. According to the IEA [34], in 2016 Saudi
Arabia net exports were 373 million tons of crude oil (19.9% of global
exports) and Russia's were 254 million tonnes (12.2% of the global
exports). Both countries have been classified as ‘patrimonial market
economies’ [35], a country classification closely linked to rentier and
semi-rentier economies and their potential to distribute rents amongst
the members of the networks, clans and families. We look at their be-
haviour in terms of short-term strategies to low oil prices—e.g., im-
plementing austerity measures, tapping into foreign exchange reserves,
revaluating the currency, selling assets, turning to debt markets, and
vertical integration (i.e., trying to get into the refining game)—as well
as possible long-term strategies—i.e., diversifying away from oil and
thereby also changing their nature as patrimonial market economies.
While the two countries share the status of being the world's largest
oil-exporting states, they have different characteristics as ‘producer
economies.’ Their ‘vital statistics’ are presented in Table 2. Since 1990
the two states have experienced quite different development trajec-
tories.
Saudi Arabia represents the archetypal ‘petrostate.’ Since 1990 it
has experienced rapid economic growth and its population has grown
from 16.3 million to 32.9 million in 2017. As a consequence, it has a
very young population and a large percentage of its population is of
working age. As a model ‘rentier state’, the social contract between the
ruling elite has been financed by oil revenues and the population enjoys
a high standard of living. Reliance on oil revenues has presented
challenges for the management of state expenditure and the state
cannot provide sufficient meaningful employment for the growing
workforce. The so-called ‘social cost of oil,’ the price needed to balance
the budget is through to be around the $80 level, while that for Russia is
around $ 70, but this is a difficult cost to calculate with any certainty.10
Energy use per capita is high and energy costs have been subsidised.
The state is wholly reliant on oil exports to generate revenue. While
there are also significant domestic gas reserves, these are increasingly
used in the domestic power sector, but they have not developed at
sufficient pace to keep up with demand growth and a significant
amount of oil is still used in the power sector (oil accounted for 41% of
power generation in 2017 according to BP's Statistical Review). The net
consequence of rapid economic growth and high levels of energy in-
tensity has been a significant growth in carbon emissions. Not sur-
prisingly, Saudi Arabia's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) is
rather opaque—an ambition of up to 130 million tons of CO2eq.
avoided by 2030—and it ties emissions reduction to successful eco-
nomic diversification strategy that is also reliant upon sustained rev-
enue from oil exports and domestic use of oil, gas and minerals.
Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia did ratify the Paris Agreement in November
2016. The NGO Action Climate Tracker has assessed Saudi Arabia's NDC
Table 1
Oil Demand Scenarios (Total Liquids in mb/d).
Source Published 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 Peak Demand
IEA WEO 2018 (New Policies) Nov-18 – 102 104 105 106 Not by 2040
IEA WEO 2018 (Sustainable Development) Nov-18 – 94 87 – 70 Before 2030
IEA WEO 2018 (Current Policies) Nov-18 – 106 111 – 121 Not by 2040
BP Outlook 2018 (Evolving Transition) Feb-18 102 106 109 110 109 2030–35
BP Outlook 2018 (Faster Transition) Feb-18 – – 101 – 92 By 2030
BP Outlook 2018 (Even Faster Transition) Feb-18 – – 96 – 80 Before 2030
Equinor (Low Demand-Renewal)a Jun-18 94 59 Early 2020s
Equinor (Reference Demand-Reform)a Jun-18 111 105 Around 2030
Equinor (High Demand-Rivalry)a June-18 115 122 Not by 2050
ExxonMobil Outlook for Energyb Feb-18 102 108 112 115 117 Not by 2040
Shell Sky Scenarioc Mar-18 105 110 106 103 101 By 2025
Source: Updated from BEIS, BEIS 2018 Fossil Fuel Price Assumptions, Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, London, 2018, pp. 33–34.
a Final column is for 2050.
b Data provided in QBTU and converted using a QBTU to md/d conversion factor of 0.54.
c Date provided EJ and converted using an EJ to mtoe conversion factor of 23.9.
Table 2
The vital statistics of Saudi Arabia and Russia.
Sources: World Bank Development Indicators Database, http://data.worldbank.
org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators and BP Statistical Review of
World Energy 2018, https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-
economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html.
2017 Indicators Saudi
Arabia
Russia
Demographics
Population (Million) 32.94 144.5
Population Growth Rate (%) 2.0 0.1
Under 14 Years (%) 25 18
14–64 Years (%) 72 64
Over 64 years (%) 3 14
Economy
GDP (Current $US) (Billions) 683.83 1577.52
GNI Per Capita PPP (Current International $) 54.770 24,890
Oil Rents as % GDP (2016) 26.4 7.0
Gas Rents as % GDP (2016) 0.7 2.7
Fuel Exports as % Merchandise Exports (2016) 79.14 47.19
Energy & Environment
Energy Use (Kg of Oil Equivalent per capita) 6937 4943
Oil Reserves (Thousand Million Tons) 36.6 14.5
Oil Production (Million Barrels a day) 11.95 11.26
Oil Consumption (Million Barrels a day) 3.92 3.22
Exportable Surplus (Million Barrels a day) 8.03 8.04
Natural Gas Reserves (Trillion Cubic Metres) 8.0 35.0
Natural Gas Production (Billion Cubic Metres) 111.4 635.6
Natural Gas Consumption (Billion Cubic Metres) 111.4 424.8
Natural Gas Exportable Surplus (Billion Cubic Metres) 0.0 210.8
Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Energy (Million Tons) 594.7 1525.3
Percent Growth per annum in Carbon Dioxide Emission
from Energy 2006-16
+4.7 −0.2
Total CO2 Emissions (Metric Tons per Capita) 19.53 11.86
10 http://graphics.wsj.com/oil-producers-break-even-prices/.
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as ‘Critically Insufficient.’11
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought severe economic
dislocation and a demographic crisis. Russia's population today is
smaller than it was in 1990 and it is only recently that the birth rate has
recovered, and life expectancy has improved. Much like the rest of the
‘developed world,’ it has an aging population and a low population
growth rate. It is only since 2000 that the economy has recovered, but
Russia was hit hard by the 2008 global financial crisis. As explained
below, although Russia has a diverse economy when compared to Saudi
Arabia, it is heavily reliant on oil and gas exports to finance the state.
Although nowhere as wasteful as during the Soviet period, domestic
energy consumption is high given the size of its economy and the level
of income of its population. Nonetheless, it has been able to maintain a
sizeable exportable surplus of oil and gas, and oil production in late
2018 hit record post-Soviet levels.12 The collapse of the economy in the
1990s and the destruction of much of the Soviet-era heavy industry
brought with it a significant fall in carbon emissions and although they
have increased since 1998, they are not back at the 1990 level.13
Russia's NDC sets an unconditional target of emissions at 25–30% below
1990 by 2030. This actually allows Russia to increase emissions 8–27%
above 2015 levels by 2020 and 18–25% by 2030; consequently, it does
not have robust plans to reduce the carbon intensity of its economy. Its
NDC is also considered as ‘Critically Insufficient’ by Climate Action
Tracker.14
It is not surprising that both states have been less than supportive of
the UNFCC process, although they supported the Paris Agreement in
2015, Saudi Arabia ratified the agreement in November 2016, but
Russia has yet to ratify it.15 Both of their commitments fall well short of
what might be considered a ‘fair share’; furthermore, both see their
future economic prosperity tied to the export and domestic use of fossil
fuels. However, as we shall see, there are significant differences in the
way that they are adjusting their development models to the possibility
of lower rents from oil and gas in the future.
4. Saudi Arabia
As the world's largest crude exporter, Saudi Arabia has long been
the kingpin of the global oil market. It is the only producer that com-
mands a significant amount of ‘spare capacity’, which is usually defined
as the volume of production that can be brought online within 30 days
and sustained for at least 90 days.16 It also benefits from low average
production costs of $ 8–9, Russia's average cost by comparison is more
than twice that at $19.17 Given that the supply of oil is otherwise quite
inelastic to price changes, this low cost reserve capacity has given the
Kingdom considerable power to engage in market management, re-
calibrating its supply in light of changing market circumstances. Saudi
Arabia is widely regarded as the informal leader of OPEC [36]. Morris
A. Adelman [37], one of the best known energy economists, likened the
Saudis to ‘the leading firm in the world oil market’, and another
economist, Robert Mabro [38], the founder of the Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies, even went as far as to claim that ‘OPEC is Saudi Arabia’.
The sheer size of Saudi oil exports makes it futile for other cartel
members to curb output without Riyadh's cooperation. It is thus no
surprise that OPEC's shifting response to oil price dynamics since 2014
has also been largely shaped by Saudi Arabia. Here we discuss the
different phases in Saudi Arabia's domestic and international oil
strategy since the 2014 oil price plunge.
4.1. Flooding the market (2014–2016)
Saudi Arabia surprised the markets in November 2014 by not
agreeing to production cuts, as it had done in 1998 and 2008 when oil
prices also fell dramatically. Riyadh's unwillingness to make cuts was
shaped by its troubled experience in the 1980s [39], when non-OPEC
sources of oil and new supplies of other energy sources, especially
nuclear and coal, were coming in fast. In response, Saudi Arabia en-
gineered collective production cuts, but many OPEC countries cheated
on their quotas. As a result, Saudi Arabia lost market share while the oil
price kept falling. Riyadh's patience was exhausted in late 1985, and
Saudi Arabia flooded the market with oil. Defending a minimum market
share came to take precedence over price maintenance [40].
Moreover, Saudi Arabia had built strong fiscal buffers during the
boom years of 2011–2014 and felt confident that it could withstand a
lower oil price for longer than rival producers. In 2014, its total reserves
(including gold) stood at a comfortable 744 billion US dollars, the third-
largest foreign reserve in the world.18 In 2014, Saudi Arabia still had one
of the world's lowest debt-to-GDP ratios, standing at 2% of GDP [41].
Under this ‘leave-it-to-the-market’ strategy, Saudi Arabia sub-
stantially increased its production. It added 450,000 barrels of oil to the
world's daily production in 2015 and, in 2016, Saudi output reached a
historical production record of more than 10.7mb/d.19 However, the
increased output did not compensate for the decline in the oil price and
hence oil revenues fell. Since oil accounts for more than 80% of gov-
ernment revenues, the Saudi government has had to tap its financial
reserves. It also needed to borrow money, first through the local bond
market and then also through international bonds. Its deficit swelled to
a historic 15% of GDP in 2015, and the government began to implement
domestic austerity measures, reducing fuel subsidies, raising electricity
taxes and cutting public sector bonuses and benefits. These are politi-
cally sensitive moves in a country where the social contract is such that
the government redistributes oil wealth and the citizens acquiesce to
the ruling of the Al Saud family in closed circles of power [42,43]. It is
worth noting that the threat was not just bottom-up, but also top-down.
Oil revenues are also used for political payments to the extended Al
Saud family to pay loyalty in the patchwork structure.
4.2. Announcing bold policy shifts
Faced with this gloomy economic outlook, Saudi Arabia made bold
domestic and international policy shifts. In early 2016, Mohammed Bin
Salman, then the deputy crown prince of Saudi Arabia, unveiled plans
to offer up to 5% of Saudi Aramco, the state-owned oil company, in an
initial public offering (IPO) as soon as in 2018. Oil minister Ali Al-
Naimi was sacked in May 2016 after holding the post for more than two
decades. Just days earlier, Bin Salman had announced bold economic
restructuring plans, dubbed ‘Saudi Vision 2030’.20 The aim is to re-
orient the Saudi economy away from dependence on oil revenues by
2020, and towards a newly conceived private sector. In June 2016,
Saudi Arabia approved its ‘National Transformation Program’ (NTP),
outlining a number of concrete initiatives to be implemented by various
ministries to realize the aspirations of ‘Vision 2030’, including in-
creasing efficiency, diversifying the economy, cutting public spending,
reducing subsidies, increasing the role of the private sector, and pri-
vatizing major public assets.21 One of the interim goals that the NTP has
11 See: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/saudi-arabia/.
12 See: https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-energy-production/update-1-
russian-oil-output-hits-post-soviet-high-in-september-idUSL8N1WI0OP.
13 See: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/russian-federation/.
14 See: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/russian-federation/.
15 See: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en.
16 Definition taken from EIA: https://www.eia.gov/finance/markets/
crudeoil/supply-opec.php.
17 http://graphics.wsj.com/oil-barrel-breakdown/.
18 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FI.RES.TOTL.CD?locations=SA&
year_high_desc=true.
19 IEA, monthly oil market report, Jan. and Dec. 2016.
20 http://vision2030.gov.sa/.
21 http://vision2030.gov.sa/sites/default/files/NTP_En.pdf.
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set out is to create over 450,000 jobs in the non-government sector by
2020.
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf producers have also been trying to get
into the renewables and nuclear business and expand the domestic use
of gas. Their drive for alternatives to oil is motivated by several factors.
The demographic and economic boom of the Gulf oil producers during
the past few decades have also made them major consumers of energy.
Hot weather conditions and lack of natural water resources have ne-
cessitated the use of increasing amounts of oil and gas for power gen-
eration required to air-conditioned homes and offices and desalinate
sea water. Replacing these fossil sources of energy with renewables and
nuclear, could free up more hydrocarbons for exports [44]. Saudi
Arabia is also trying to move into the refining business to reduce fuel
imports and capture margins now bequeathed to competitors [45].
4.3. Saudi-Russian rapprochement
Internationally, Saudi Arabia began to loosen its opposition to
production cuts in OPEC, especially when several non-OPEC producers
signalled their willingness to join a collective effort [46]. Initial talks in
April 2016 to come to a production freeze with Russia and other
partners failed after Saudi Arabia refused to sign a deal that did not also
apply to Iran. Five months later, Iran had regained 80% of the market
share it held before sanctions intensified in 2012, and an agreement to
cut production was reached among a broad coalition of 24 producer
countries, referred to here as ‘OPEC+’. Production limits were origin-
ally intended to apply for only six months, from January to June 2017,
but were later extended until the end of March 2018.
Amidst growing signs of market rebalancing, the OPEC + countries,
led by Saudi Arabia and Russia reached an agreement in June 2018 to
raise production by 1 mb/d [46]. However, in the second half of 2018,
oil prices began to decline on the back of renewed surge in US shale
production, concerns about consumption growth and sanctions waivers
for Iran's exports. This led OPEC and its allies in December 2018 to
agree to extend the production cuts at a level of 1.2 mb/d.
4.4. Challenges to the Saudi social contract
The domestic political agenda is crucial to understand why Saudi
Arabia changed course in 2016 and decided OPEC should go back to
managing supply after a two-year ‘pump-at-will’ strategy aimed at de-
fending market share. The sustained period of low oil prices created the
urgent need to plug holes in the budget. The plan to sell stakes in the
state-owned oil company would also benefit from higher oil prices,
which is likely one of the reasons why the IPO has been delayed. To the
extent that oil prices continue to stay low, there appears to be no al-
ternative to some form of fiscal retrenchment in Saudi Arabia. Since the
Riyal is pegged to the dollar, the kingdom does not have the option to
devalue its currency. Saudi Arabia's radical domestic reforms may
create demand for exchange rate flexibility in the long term but, in the
short term, Saudi Arabia has strong incentives to stick to the currency
peg. Abandoning the peg or re-pegging at a lower value could damage
investor confidence and spark a capital flight, and any of its purported
material benefits are likely to be offset by an increase in import prices
[47].
Sticking to the dollar peg in the face of lower oil prices thus creates
the need for less public spending, more room for private initiative in the
economy, and more transparency.
In 2018, for example, Saudi Arabia for the first time allowed an
independent assessment of its crude reserves by independent auditors
as part of preparations for the IPO of state oil company Saudi Aramco.22
The company also released its first bond prospectus in April 2019, as it
decided to tap the public debt markets to raise funds for its recent
$69bn purchase of local petrochemicals company Sabic. The prospectus
for the first time revealed the financial performance of the state oil
giant, which had been kept undisclosed for decades.
More importantly, in January 2018, Saudi Arabia introduced a new
value-added tax (VAT) of 5% on consumption of the majority of goods
and services, including energy and food, to increase non-oil revenue.
The move is all the more striking if one considers that, during the
1986–2004 oil bust period, Saudi Arabia did not raise energy prices or
impose a VAT. The price increases were not well received by the po-
pulation. As Jim Krane writes: “In Saudi Arabia, commentary ranged
from outright support to personal attacks on ministers, technocrats and
even royal family members. Cautious Saudis began tweeting pictures of
King Abdullah unaccompanied by text. The portraits evoked the late
ruler's patronage of the poor as commentary on his successor's turn
toward extraction.” [48].
These are all factors that have the potential to fundamentally
change the political economy on which the Saudi state has been based
for decades. With Vision 2030, the Saudi leadership is trying to im-
plement fundamental changes to the country's social contract, whereby
the government traditionally distributes the oil wealth to the popula-
tion in exchange for public acquiescence to autocratic rule. If the po-
pulation can no longer count on the subsidised services that they have
grown accustomed to, the government will need to find alternative
sources of legitimacy. It could bring greater openness and public in-
volvement in decision-making, or it could lead to an intensified au-
thoritarian model of rule.
A complicating factor is that the economic restructuring plan co-
incides with a leadership transition. The current ruler, King Salman, is
the last in a long line of sons of Ibn Saud to rule the lands his father
conquered. The real strong man is Mohammed bin Salman (Mbs), who
has rapidly risen to the position of crown prince in June 2017, leap-
frogging many other candidates. In November 2017, he further con-
solidated power by ordering an alleged anti-corruption shakedown,
detaining hundreds of Saudi royals and businessmen in the Ritz Carlton
hotel in Riyadh and confiscating large portions of their finances. The
ongoing crackdown on royals and businessmen could be interpreted as
a power shift towards a narrow subset of the royal family, and hence a
direct challenge to the patrimonial nature of the state. Since Vision
2030 is strongly associated with MbS, intra-elite animosity—such as the
2017–2019 ‘anti-corruption’ purge—could end up being a distraction
from the fundamental need to restructure the economy.
In May 2018, that is, two years after the launch of Vision 2030, the
IMF declared that Saudi Arabia was making “good progress” in im-
plementing reforms.23 The Public Investment Fund (PIF) of Saudi
Arabia has been transformed from a sleepy domestic holding company
to a very active investment fund. The PIF is central to the country's
diversification plans. It made several large investments in new tech-
nologies such as ride-sharing (Uber), electric vehicles (Tesla), and solar
energy (through an investment in the Softbank Vision Fund). At home,
the PIF has plans to help build a $500 bn city called Neom on the Red
Sea and it has set up a $1.1 bn fund to support small- and medium-sized
enterprises.
However, in several respects the reforms have become bogged
down. The initial public offering of Saudi Aramco has been postponed
several times. It is now scheduled for 2021, although some observers
think the plan has been shelved indefinitely. The postponement of the
Aramco IPO is a blow to the plan to propel the PIF to the ranks of giant
global sovereign wealth funds. Instead, PIF might raise money by
selling stakes in Saudi listed companies. While this would allow the PIF
to convert part of its holding into cash provided by Aramco, it would
make the IPO of Aramco an even more distant prospect [49].
22 https://www.reuters.com/article/saudi-oil-reserves/update-3-saudi-
arabia-announces-rise-in-oil-reserves-after-external-audit-idUSL8N1Z93WO.
23 https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/05/22/pr18190-imf-staff-
completes-2018-article-iv-mission-to-saudi-arabia.
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In addition, the country's reputation has been tarnished by the
catastrophic war in Yemen, the Carlton Ritz crackdown, and the murder
of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, which scared off some
foreign investors from attending an investment conference—dubbed
‘Davos in the Desert’— and lead to a short-term capital flight [50].
Inflows of foreign direct investment dropped by more than 80% in 2017
to a mere $1.4 billion, down from $7.5 billion in 2016 [51]. In 2018,
they recovered to $3 billion, but this is still less than one-tenth of its
2008 peak [52]. While the economy has returned to growth, at 2.21%
in 2018 it remains lacklustre.24 In an effort to boost growth, Saudi
Arabia plans to increase state spending by 7% in 2019, slowing the
country's efforts to cut the big budget deficit caused by low prices.25
Unemployment rates have been creeping up to almost 13% in 2018,
which is the highest in the Kingdom's history.26
Clearly, the challenges and obstacles in implementing the economic
diversification plans remain high. The outlined plans to cut oil depen-
dence are bold and require sustained political support from the coun-
try's top decision-makers. Yet, factors such as falling oil prices or public
discontent could stall or even reverse existing reforms. Importantly, the
reforms are as much about changing the patrimonial nature of the state
than they are about restructuring the economy.
5. Russia
If Saudi Arabia has bold plans to modernise its industrial base and to
diversify its economy, Russia appears to have no such ambition.
Although policy-makers in Russia have promoted a number of in-
itiatives to expand non-hydrocarbon industrial capabilities in recent
years, these efforts have not received sufficient financial or industrial
support to make a real difference [53–55]. Meanwhile, as the leaders of
other hydrocarbon-producing countries acknowledge the importance of
preparing for a post-hydrocarbon future, official Russian energy stra-
tegies continue to emphasise the importance of increasing production
and export of oil and gas [56]. As a result, Russia's well-established
vulnerability to fluctuations in oil prices is likely to persist.
5.1. Russia's resource addiction
Although Russia was, in 2017, the world's second largest net oil
exporter it has historically been a ‘price taker’ on international oil
markets. It has never been a member of OPEC and has had a troubled
relationship with the cartel, although it shares a need to maximize
revenues from its oil industry. Subject to the average price of oil in a
given year, revenues derived from the taxation of the extraction and
export of oil and gas account for between one third and half of Russia's
federal budget receipts [57].
The contribution of oil and gas to the budget does not, however,
capture the importance of oil and gas to the wider Russian economy.
Revenues generated by oil and gas firms are recycled throughout the
economy in the form of either taxes paid to the government, or as de-
mand for other goods and services produced in Russia [58]. According
to calculations by Alexei Kudrin and Evsei Gurvich [59], cumulative
surplus (cf. the base year of 1999) oil and gas revenues amounted to
$2.1 trillion (in 2013 USD). These revenues ensure that demand for
Russia's large manufacturing sector—the tenth largest in the world by
value-added in 2014, according to UN data [60]—remains high. State
transfers to social welfare recipients (the so-called byudzhetniki, which
roughly translates as ‘budget people’ in English) maintain domestic
demand, as does state procurement of goods and services, including
orders for Russia's large defence-industrial complex, which continues to
employ over 2 million people. It is this dependence of Russia's wider
economy on oil and gas revenues that explains why Russia is so sus-
ceptible to fluctuations in the price of oil [61]. In this respect, Russia
differs from the conventional ‘petrostate’ in so far as it has a large non-
hydrocarbon sector. The problem is that much of the non-hydrocarbon
sector is uncompetitive on global markets (hence the low share in
Russia's export basket) and so therefore is dependent on domestic de-
mand, which in turn is driven by the total value of oil and gas revenues
[62].
The close links between the hydrocarbons sector and the rest of the
economy are evident when looking at the correlation between move-
ments in the volume of oil and gas receipts on the one hand, and
movements in key economic indicators like GDP, investment, manu-
facturing output, on the other hand. Between 2001 and 2015, the sta-
tistical correlation between annual movements in total natural resource
revenues, on the one hand, and with GDP (Pearson's r=0.88), fixed
investment (r=0.84), and industrial production (r=0.83) was ex-
tremely strong [61]. Until 2018, the price of oil was also the single most
important predictor of the rouble-dollar exchange rate [61]. In the
wake of the 2014 collapse in the oil price, the Kremlin allowed the
rouble to depreciate, losing 60% of its value against the US dollar. This
allowed the Russian Government to balance its books at a lower oil
price—around $ 43 in 2018, and also reduced the relative production
costs of domestic oil production.
5.2. A different kind of petrostate
The importance of oil and gas to the wider Russian economy has
ensured that state control over the industry is an important feature of
the country's system of political economy. Nevertheless, whereas only
one company controls oil production in Saudi Arabia, production is
more dispersed in Russia [63]. In the 1990s, oil production was largely
carried out by private companies, while gas production was mono-
polised by state-owned Gazprom. However, this changed as oil prices
rose between 2000 and 2008, and as Vladimir Putin strengthened the
role of the state in the Russian economy, not least to bolster Russia's
credentials as an ‘energy superpower’ [64–66]. Private oil companies,
such as Yukos, Sibneft, and Bashneft, were renationalised with the
management of powerful NOCs like Rosneft and Gazpromneft entrusted
to individuals with close personal links to Mr Putin. On the face of it,
greater competition was introduced in the gas industry, but this only
takes the form of competition between state-owned firms (Gazprom and
Rosneft) or by a firm with close links to the Kremlin (Novatek). This
relative dispersion of production between several state-owned or state-
influenced entities means that there remains considerable scope for
disagreement and discord within the oil and gas sectors as rival groups
struggle to assert their influence over one another. This has left the
Russian energy industry in the rather paradoxical situation in which the
state's involvement is a necessary but not always sufficient condition for
the implementation of public policy.
The use of state control and influence over the oil and gas sector
helped the state to ensure that revenues were redistributed to achieve
objectives defined by the state. This resulted in a growth model that
worked well enough until 2008 [58,67]. Indeed, between 2000 and
2008, real GDP grew at an average annual rate of close to 8%. In dollar
terms, it grew even faster than the Chinese economy over the same
period. However, the global recession of 2008–09 hit Russia hard. As oil
prices slumped from nearly $140 p/b in the summer of 2008 to nearly
$30 p/b in early 2009, Russia experienced the worst recession of any of
the G-20 economies [68].
Russia's policy elite reacted to this crisis by drawing up a pro-
gramme of modernisation and diversification. The then-president,
Dmitry Medvedev, was associated with what optimists saw as a broad-
based ‘modernisation’ agenda. However, the sense of urgency attached
24 General Authority for Statistics, KSA, https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/823.
25 https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-arabia-budget-instant-view/saudi-
2019-state-budget-boosts-spending-idUKKBN1OH1SG.
26 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-budget-energy-industry/
foreign-investment-in-saudi-arabia-more-than-doubled-in-2018-minister-
idUSKBN1OI0QU.
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to Medvedev's ‘modernisation’ agenda quickly fizzled out when oil
prices rebounded to over $100 p/b in 2010. As shown in Fig. 1, the total
inflation-adjusted value of Russia's hydrocarbons exports was higher
between 2010 and 2013 than before the 2008-9 global financial crisis.
As a result, the impetus to undertake the difficult reforms required to
reduce hydrocarbon dependence diminished [69]. Instead, rising hy-
drocarbon revenues were allocated to support an ambitious rear-
mament programme and a generous social welfare system [70–72].
5.3. Russia under sanctions
The failure to address Russia's hydrocarbon dependence became
apparent again in the autumn of 2014 when oil prices again collapsed,
causing GDP to decline over the course of 2015–16. This was ex-
acerbated by the imposition of Western sanctions - some of which tar-
geted oil and gas production – in response to Russia's annexation of
Crimea and subsequent involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine
[73]. Once again, policy-makers rushed to formulate a plan to boost
industrial capabilities outside the oil and gas sectors, this time under
the banner of ‘import substitution’. Considerable funds and institutional
support were put in place to promote the development of industries of –
as defined by Russian state officials – ‘strategic’ importance [55]. As
originally conceived, the import substitution strategy envisaged the
implementation of 2059 projects across 19 branches of the economy
between 2016 and 2020 [74]. This plan was, according to Vladimir
Putin, intended to enhance Russia's “economic sovereignty and the
development of [the] economy as a high-productivity and high-tech-
nology [economy]’ [75]. Once again, the country's senior political
leadership seemed serious about economic diversification. There were,
however, two fundamental flaws in Russia's chosen policy course.
First, while much of the official rhetoric since 2014 has focused on
the development of capabilities outside the natural resources industries,
in practice the role of hydrocarbons grew. In most years since 2010,
investment in the oil and gas sector grew faster than the overall rate of
investment in the wider economy, causing the share of hydrocarbons in
investment to rise not decline (see Fig. 2). All things being equal, this
was likely to cause the weight of hydrocarbons in the Russian economy
to grow not decline. As a result, new deals to build gas pipelines were
signed with China (‘Power of Siberia’; planned annual capacity of 38
bcm) and Turkey (‘TurkStream’; planned annual capacity of 31.5 bcm)
in 2014 and 2016 respectively [76]. In 2015, it was also announced that
the Nord Stream gas pipeline linking Russia with Germany would be
expanded from 55 bcm per year to 110 bcm. Although the planned
project - named Nord Stream II - initially met resistance in Europe, a
financing agreement between Gazprom and Uniper, Wintershall, Engie,
OMV and Royal Dutch Shell was signed in April 2017 that enabled the
project to proceed despite staunch opposition from EU members such as
Poland and Sweden [77].
This flurry of deals is indicative of a broader tendency in Russia's
foreign economic policy. Designed to open up new sources of trade and
investment with non-Western countries after 2014, this policy was
primarily based on the expansion of hydrocarbon exports (as well as on
the export of nuclear power generation machinery), either from de-
posits in Russia or through deposits in other countries run with the help
of Russia's state-owned firms in the likes of Venezuela and Vietnam
[78].
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, plans to develop
manufacturing capabilities and ostensibly diversify the country's eco-
nomic structure are in fact contingent on the existence of a thriving
hydrocarbons sector. Twelve of the nineteen non-military areas of the
economy identified by the government's import substitution strategy of
2015 were in the oil and gas extraction equipment industry [79]. Am-
bitious plans estimated to cost nearly Rb. 200 billion (c. $3 billion at the
exchange rate in May 2019), to develop the ship-building industry in
Russia's Far East, at the Zvezda complex at Bol'shoi Kamen’, near Vla-
divostok, were predicated on supplying ships and marine equipment to
facilitate off-shore oil and gas extraction, as well as vessels to service
the emerging Northern Sea Route [80]. Initially, only Rosneft – the
major stakeholder in Zvezda – demonstrated any significant interest in
buying vessels from the shipyard. This put the future of the project in
doubt. However, after strenuous lobbying by Igor Sechin, Rosneft's
CEO, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, intervened, resulting in
orders for vessels to rise quickly [81]. It was reported that the vessels
produced at Zvezda will be up to 30% more expensive than comparable
Fig. 1. Oil and gas export revenues, 2001-2018 (constant 2015 USD, billion). Source: Bank of Russia (2019); authors' calculations.
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vessels built in South Korea, resulting in the Russian state providing
subsidies to compensate domestic buyers [82]. To reduce the threat of
foreign competition, import substitution legislation was enacted that
demanded only Russian-made vessels could traverse the NSR [83].
Put simply, the import substitution plan appeared in important re-
spects designed to perpetuate and not reduce the dependence of the
wider Russian economy on the oil and gas sector. After all, if policy-
makers in Russia were serious about diversification, why would they
invest in industries that require an expansion of future hydrocarbon
production? While it is true that exports of agricultural products and
nuclear power generation machinery, uranium and nuclear fuels are
rising, it remains the case that the financial value of non-hydrocarbon
exports is modest when compared with oil and gas exports. To put their
value in perspective: in 2018 around $20 billion of agricultural pro-
ducts were exported, while Rosatom's international revenues in 2017
amounted to $6.1 billion in 2017 [84,85]. Consequently, in stark con-
trast to official rhetoric, Russia's current policy course is that of a
country doubling down on its bet that hydrocarbons will support eco-
nomic (as well as social and political) development well into the future.
Russia's resource rent addiction looks set to continue [58].
5.4. The role of energy in Russia's wider strategy
There is a simple explanation for the apparent reluctance of Russian
policy-makers to prepare for a world in which demand for hydro-
carbons either plateaus or declines: they simply do not believe that
there is a significant chance of this taking place, at least not in the next
few decades. This should not have surprised observers. Russia's most
recent draft energy strategy, published in 2014, stressed the need to
expand hydrocarbon production and Russia's exports to rapidly-
growing non-Western markets with the aim of maintaining Russia's
position as one of the world's top-three hydrocarbon exporting coun-
tries [78].27 According to the draft strategy, the main threat to Russia
will come not from a decline in demand, but instead from greater
competition from other suppliers, most notably the US [85]. What is
needed to deal with this competition, according to the authors, is to
diversify the customer base for Russian hydrocarbon exports, and, more
specifically, to expand deliveries to rapidly-growing Asian economies.
As the document states, expanding exports will require developing new
deposits in Russia, primarily in the Arctic – both off-shore and on-shore
– and in Russia's Far East. This corresponds with another oft-stated
objective of the Russian government: to develop the Arctic. For Russian
officials, climate change and the shrinking of polar ice offers the op-
portunity to extract more natural resources and to utilise the Northern
Sea Route (NSR), both as a transit route in its own right, and to facil-
itate the more intensive exploitation of the Arctic [86].
It is clear from reading the full range of official strategic planning
documents – from those dealing with energy and the Arctic to those
dealing with national security and naval strategy – that Russian officials
envisage an intensification of competition over natural resources in the
years ahead [87]. As a result, it is imperative that Russia exploits its
resource base to both survive and thrive in a world that is likely to be
characterised by resource scarcity, not abundance. This demonstrates
that the reason that policy-makers in Russia do not see the urgency in
moving away from hydrocarbons is because they perceive the changing
global energy landscape in a very different way to many analysts from
elsewhere in the world.
5.5. Consequences for foreign economic policy
The reluctance and subsequent failure of policy-makers to chart a
course that might reduce Russia's hydrocarbon dependence was also
evident in the sphere of foreign economic policy. After the imposition of
Western sanctions on Russia in 2014, Russian policy-makers accelerated
efforts to generate a more pluri-directional character to Russia's foreign
economic relations. This involved fostering closer links with countries
of the ‘non-West’ [88]. For Russia, most of this effort was directed to-
wards forging closer links with China, but attention was also paid to
other Asian countries, including India, Indonesia, South Korea and
Vietnam, and to countries in the Middle East and Africa [89]. It was
Fig. 2. Investment in Russian oil and gas industries, 2010-2018 (per cent annual change in value of investment, constant 2015 rubles). Source: Federal State Statistics
Service (2019); authors' calculations.
27 Energy strategy documents are required by law to be updated every five
years.
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hoped that this rebalancing of foreign economic relations would give
Russian policy-makers more options in their relations with the outside
world [90].
This desire to forge closer economic relations with a more diverse
range of countries is understandable. However, the primary instrument
used by Russia to build these closer ties is energy exports, as signalled in
Russian strategic planning documents. In recent years, officials from the
Russian government and from state-owned energy companies, such as
Rosneft and Gazprom, signed deals to supply gas to Turkey and China,
and to acquire downstream assets in, inter alia, India and Indonesia
[61]. This was done so that new sources of demand for Russian energy
could replace plateauing energy demand from Russia's traditional cus-
tomers in Europe. The risk, as with domestic economic policy, is that if
the value of Russia's exports declines, perhaps due to a decline in global
demand for hydrocarbons, then a central tenet of Russia's foreign eco-
nomic policy will be severely weakened.
To sum up: while officials in Russian often speak as though eco-
nomic diversification is an important policy objective, the actions of the
state suggest that oil and gas are, and look set to remain, the most
important sectors of the economy. This is of crucial importance because
of the high stakes involved. Russia faces many challenges that will re-
quire a strong economy to solve, including but not limited to: a dete-
riorating demographic profile; plans to continue with military moder-
nisation; a need to invest in dilapidated infrastructure; and, of course,
the need to promote new industries. However, the current policy tra-
jectory means that if Russia's vast reserves of hydrocarbons do become
‘stranded’ for the reasons stated earlier in this article, its leaders will
find themselves without a plan and without any money. Russia's future
generations may well regret that today's policy-makers did not show the
same foresight as their Saudi counterparts.
6. Conclusions
We have argued that the combination of fossil fuel abundance as a
result of the shale revolution and cost and efficiency improvements in
conventional oil production, and future falling demand for oil as a
consequence of climate change mitigation is laying the foundations for
a new oil order. As Dale and Fattouh [32] argue, that new order will be
characterised by lower prices and an emphasis on cost competitiveness.
Both they and the IEA [5] suggest that producer economies must do
more to reduce their reliance on oil and gas rents to balance their
budgets. In this context, just when global oil demand will peak is less
significant than what happens thereafter. Clearly the oil industry and
the producer economies would hope for a gradual decline, with sig-
nificant remaining oil demand—and rents—and continued investment
in new fields, though only the most cost competitive ones. However, the
urgency of the climate change challenge, as illustrated by the IPCC's
recent report, demands an early peak and a rapid decline in con-
sumption thereafter. It is clear that there are huge uncertainties here
and no one is sure of the eventual pace of change. But what is clear, as
demonstrated by the IEA [5] study, is that the old economic model of
the fossil fuel producer economies will face fundamental challenges in
the future. To avoid economic hardship and political instability, those
economies must amplify their efforts to diversify and also pursue the
decarbonisation of their domestic energy systems, both as a contribu-
tion to climate change mitigation and as a means of maintaining an
exportable surplus to finance clean investment and energy access.
It is clear from our preliminary analysis that Saudi Arabia at least
has the right intentions in terms of its vision for 2030, but the current
turmoil in oil market, and its growing social costs, will make it difficult
to finance its ambitious plans. Its recent actions make clear its de-
termination to preserve its market share and it has the benefit of an
abundance of some of the lowest cost oil. Furthermore, it understands
the benefit in developing domestic use of natural gas, developing re-
newables and possibly nuclear power to preserve oil exports. This will
bring the added benefit of reducing its carbon emissions in line with its
modest commitments to the Paris Agreement. Thus, it is possible to see
a synergy between its economic strategy and wider climate change
policy, so long as—it would maintain–its near-term oil revenues are not
threatened.
Russia, it would seem, has different intentions. Its commitment to
the Paris Agreement shows little or no ambition and its energy and
economic developments strategies, such that they are, are based on
significant increases in oil and gas production and exports. The problem
for Russia, when it comes to oil, is that it is running out of cheap
production and future production may depend on the development of
the Arctic offshore, which is made all the more difficult by sanctions.
The problem for gas is finding new markets that are profitable.
Furthermore, rather than diversifying its economic base, it is pursuing a
policy of import substitution to support the oil and gas industry. In
short, there is little evidence that Russia is seeking to reduce its fossil
fuel addiction.
Why does this matter? Neither Saudi Arabia nor Russia have been
supportive of international efforts to address climate change, now it
seems they are being joined by the United States. Together they could
cause further mischief that might slow the implementation of the Paris
Agreement and blunt ambitions to ‘ratchet’ up future commitments.
However, it is to be hoped that the rest of the world presses ahead—as
they did when the US announced its decision to leave the agree-
ment—and delivers on the Paris Agreement and more. Ironically, that
poses a different challenge. If the world manages to get on a trajectory
that will result in an early peak in oil demand and a significant fall in
consumption thereafter, then Russia, and possibly Saudi Arabia, will
find themselves in a very difficult situation, perhaps joined by the likes
of Nigeria and a few others. This study contributes an emerging dis-
cussion, stimulated in part by IRENA's report, that relates to the geo-
political consequences of the energy transformation [91]. The fossil fuel
economies are not going to disappear overnight [92], but we would
agree with the IEA that now is the time for them to start thinking about
the economic development strategies required for them thrive in the
2030s and beyond when demand for oil and gas, and the prices that
they command, seem certain to fall. If there is a tight oil market in the
early 2020s, as some predict, that results in prices, those revenues
should be used to fund economic diversification and decarbonisation at
home, rather than being squandered on further investment in fossil fuel
production and associated infrastructures that are likely to be stranded
in the decades that follow. The irony is that a return to high oil prices
will probably fuel permanent demand destruction as consumers move
to low-carbon alternatives. This highlights the fact that while the pace
of change is the key uncertainty, the 2020s looks to be a challenging
decade as the fossil fuel exporters start to face the consequences of the
low carbon energy transition and new challenges emerge associated
with the growth the low carbon economy. Ultimately, a failure to re-
cognise the geopolitical dimensions of the low carbon energy transition,
and in particular the threats that it poses to incumbent industries and
economies reliant on fossil fuels, will result in tensions and conflicts
that undermine the collective action required to arrest emissions and
reduce the impacts of climate change.
Funding
Michael Bradshaw's contribution to this article is based on research
funded by the UK Research Council (Grant nos EPSRC EP/L024756/1
and NERC NE/G007748/1) as part of the UK Energy Research Centre
(UKERC).
M. Bradshaw, et al. Energy Strategy Reviews 26 (2019) 100374
10
References
[1] IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5oC: Summary for Policymakers, World Meteorological
Office, Geneva, 2018.
[2] K. Al-Falih, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's National Statement, (2018) https://ksa-
climate.com/the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabias-national-statement/ , Accessed date: 15
December 2018.
[3] J.G. Garber, U.S. National Statement at COP24, (2018) https://www.state.gov/e/
oes/rls/remarks/2018/288054.htm , Accessed date: 18 January 2019.
[4] D. Helm, Burn Out: the Endgame for Fossil Fuels, Yale University Press, New Haven,
2017.
[5] IEA, Outlook for Producer Economies, What Do Changing Energy Dynamics Mean
for Major Oil and Gas Exporters? IEA, Paris, 2018.
[6] IRENA, Global, Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation, A New
World: the Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation, IRENA, Abu Dhabi, 2019.
[7] The geopolitics of renewables, in: D. Scholten (Ed.), Lect. Notes Eng. (2018),
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67855-9.
[8] T. Van de Graaf, T., A. Verbruggen, The oil endgame: strategies of oil exporters in a
carbon-constrained world, Environ. Sci. Policy 54 (2015) 456–462 https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.envsci.2015.08.004.
[9] T. Van de Graaf, M. Bradshaw, The stranded wealth of nations: rethinking the
politics of oil in an age of abundance, Int. Aff. 93 (2018) 1309–1328 https://doi.
org/10.1093/ia/iiy197.
[10] T. Seba, Clean Disruption: Disruption of Energy and Transportation. Clean Planet
Ventures, Silcon Vally, 2014.
[11] R. Cherif, F. Hasanov, A. Pande, A. Riding the Energy Transition: Oil beyond 2040,
IMF, Washington D.C, 2017.
[12] T. Van de Graaf, Is OPEC dead? Oil exporters, the Paris agreement and the transition
to a post-carbon world, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 23 (2017) 182–188 https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.erss.2016.10.005.
[13] T. Mitrova, T. Boersma, The Impact of US LNG on Russian Natural Gas Export
Policy, the Impact of US LNG on Russian Natural Gas Export Policy, Centre on
Global Energy Policy, Columbia/SIPA, New York, 2018.
[14] D.H. Dunn, M.J. McClelland, Shale gas and the revival of American power: de-
bunking decline? Int. Aff. 89 (2013) 1411–1428 https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-
2346.12081.
[15] R.Q. Grafton, I.G. Cronshaw, M.C. Moore, Risks, Rewards and Regulation of
Unconventional Gas: A Global Perspective, CUP, Cambridge, 2017.
[16] M.L. O'Sullivan, Windfall: How the New Energy Abundance Upends Global Politics
and Strengthens America's Power, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2017.
[17] J. Henderson, J.B. Fattouh, Russia and OPEC: Uneasy Partners, Oxford Energy
Studies, Energy Comment, 2016, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp.../
Russia-and-OPEC-Uneasy-Partners.pdf , Accessed date: 19 January 2019.
[18] R.F. Aguilera, M. Radetzki, M. The Price of Oil, CUP, Cambridge, 2016.
[19] R. McNally, Crude Volatility: the History and the Future of Boom and Bust Oil
Prices, Columbia University Press, New York, 2017.
[20] UNDP, Emissions Gap Report 2018, UNDP, Nairobi, 2018https://www.
unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018 , Accessed date: 19
January 2019.
[21] Oil Change International, The Sky's the Limit: Why the Paris Climate Goals Require
a Managed Decline of Fossil Fuel Production, Oil Change International, Washington
D.C., 2018http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2016/09/OCI_the_skys_limit_
2016_FINAL_2.pdf , Accessed date: 18 January 2019.
[22] K. Bond, 2020 Vision: Why You Should See Peak Fossil Fuels Coming, Carbon
Tracker Initiative, London, 2018https://www.carbontracker.org/reports/2020-
vision-why-you-should-see-the-fossil-fuel-peak-coming/ , Accessed date: 18
January 2019.
[23] IEA, World Energy Outlook 2018, IEA, Paris, 2018.
[24] BP 2018, Energy Outlook 2018, BP, London, 2018https://www.bp.com/content/
dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-economics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-
2018.pdf , Accessed date: 19 January 2019.
[25] ExxonMobil, Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040, Exxon Mobil, Irving, 2018,
https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/energy/energy-outlook , Accessed date: 19
January 2019.
[26] Equinor, Energy Perspectives 2018, Equinor, Oslo, 2018https://www.equinor.com/
en/how-and-why/sustainability/energy-perspectives.html , Accessed date: 19
January 2019.
[27] Sky Shell, Meeting the Goals of the Paris Agreement, Shell International B.V., The
Hague, 2018https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/
scenarios/shell-scenario-sky.html , Accessed date: 19 January 2019.
[28] G. Carrington, J. Stephenson, The politics of energy scenarios: are International
Energy Agency and other conservative projections hampering the renewable energy
transition? 46 (2018), pp. 103–113 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.07.011.
[29] Oil Change International, Greenpeace, Forecasting Failure, Why Investors Should
Treat Oil Company Energy Forecasts with Caution, Oil Change International,
Washington D.C., 2017http://priceofoil.org/2017/03/13/forecasting-failure-
report/ , Accessed date: 19 January 2019.
[30] Oil Change International, Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, off
Track: How the International Energy Agency Guides towards Fossil Fuel
Dependence and Climate Change, Oil Change International, Washington D.C.,
2018http://priceofoil.org/2018/04/04/off-track-the-iea-and-climate-change/ ,
Accessed date: 19 January 2019.
[31] B.K. Sovacool, How long will it take? Conceptualizing the temporal dynamics of
energy transitions, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 13 (2016) 202–215 https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.erss.2015.12.020.
[32] S. Dale, B. Fattouh, Peak Oil Demand and Long-Run Oil Prices, Energy Insight No.
25, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, 2018https://www.oxfordenergy.
org/publications/peak-oil-demand-long-run-oil-prices/ , Accessed date: 17 January
2019.
[33] B. Fattouh, R. Poudineh, R. West, The Rise of Renewables and Energy Transition:
what Adaptation Strategy for Oil Companies and Oil-Exporting Countries? OIES
Paper: MAP vol. 19, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, 2018https://www.
oxfordenergy.org/publications/rise-renewables-e , Accessed date: 17 January 2019.
[34] IEA, World Energy Statistics 2018, IEA, Paris, 2018http://data.iea.org/payment/
products/118-world-energy-statistics-2018-edition.aspx , Accessed date: 19
January 2019.
[35] D. Buhr, R. Frankenberger, Emerging varieties of incorporated capitalism.
Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence, Bus. Polit. 16 (2014) 393–427
https://doi.org/10.1515/bap-2013-0020.
[36] D.H. Claes, The Politics of Oil-Producer Cooperation, Westview Press, Boulder, CO,
2001.
[37] M. Adelmam, The Genie Out of the Bottle: World Oil since 1970, MIT Press
Cambridge, MA, 1995.
[38] R. Mabro, Can OPEC hold the line? Middle East Econ. Surv. 21 (1975).
[39] B. Fattouh, R. Poudineh, A. Sen, The dynamics of the revenue maximization–market
share trade-off: Saudi Arabia's oil policy in the 2014–15 price fall, Oxf. Rev. Econ.
Policy 32 (2016) 223–240 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grw010.
[40] F. Parra, Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum, IB Tauris, New York, 2004.
[41] IMF, Saudi Arabia, Selected Issues, IMF Country Report, No. 16/327, IMF,
Washington D.C., 2016https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/
31/Saudi-Arabia-Selected-Issues-44329 , Accessed date: 17 January 2019.
[42] A.H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: the Political,
Foreign Policy, Economic, and Energy Dimensions, Praeger, Westport, 2003.
[43] S. Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2011.
[44] N. Sultan, The challenge of shale to the post-oil dreams of the Arab Gulf, Energy
Policy 60 (2013) 13–20 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.04.070.
[45] J. Krane, A refined approach: Saudi Arabia moves beyond crude, Energy Policy 82
(2015) 99–104 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2015.03.008.
[46] J. Henderson, B. Fattouh, Russia and OPEC: Uneasy Partners, Oxford Energy
Studies, Energy Comment, 2016, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/
russia-and-opec-uneasy-partners/ , Accessed date: 19 January 2019.
[47] L. Pinto, Sustaining the GCC Currency Pegs: the Need for Collaboration, Brookings
Doha Center. Policy Briefing, Feb. 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/research/
sustaining-the-gcc-currency-pegs-the-need-for-collaboration/ , Accessed date: 7
May 2019.
[48] J. Krane, Subsidies reform and tax increases in the rentier Middle East, The Politics
of Rentier States in the Gulf. POMEPS Studies, vol. 33, 2019, pp. 19–20 https://
pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/POMEPS_Studies_33.pdf , Accessed
date: 7 May 2019.
[49] L. Denning, Saudi Aramco's Strange Chemical Attraction, Bloomberg, 19 July 2018,
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-19/saudi-aramco-
considering-sabic-stake-is-bad-news-for-an-ipo , Accessed date: 19 January 2019.
[50] B. Chapman, Investors Pull $1bn Out of Saudia Arabia's Stock Market as Fallout
from Jamal Khashoggi Death Deepens, (22 October, 2018) Independent https://
www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/saudi-arabia-stock-market-jamal-
khashoggi-death-murder-finance-economy-a8595781.html , Accessed date: 10 May
2019.
[51] UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2018, UNCTAD, New York, 2018.
[52] UNCTAD, Investment trends monitor, 21 (31) (2019) 5 21 January.
[53] R. Connolly, State industrial policy in Russia: the case of the nanotechnology in-
dustry, Post Sov. Aff. 29 (2013) 1–30 https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2013.
778545.
[54] B. Kuznetsov, Y. Simachev, Evolution of state industrial policy in Russia, J. New
Econ. Assoc. 22 (2014) 152–178 RePEc:nea:journl:y:2014:i:22:p:152-178.
[55] R. Connolly, P. Hanson, Import Substitution and Economic Sovereignty in Russia,
Chatham House, London, 2016https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/
import-substitution-and-economic-sovereignty-russia , Accessed date: 19 January
2019.
[56] K. Moldotsov, Russia's energy complex long-term perspectives until 2035: chal-
lenges and new opportunities, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Presentation to the 21st Sakhalin
Oil and Gas Conference, 2017.
[57] Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, (2018).
[58] C.G. Gaddy, B.W. Ickes, B.W., The Russian economy through 2020: the challenge of
managing rent addiction, in: M. Lipman, N. Petrov (Eds.), Russia in 2020: Scenarios
for the Future, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C,
2011, pp. 165–186.
[59] A. Kudrin, A.,E. Gurvich, Novoi modeli rosta dlya rossiskoi ekonomiki, Vopr. Ekon.
12 (2014) 4–32.
[60] UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organisation), Manufacturing
Value-Added (MVA) Database, (2016) http://stat.unido.org/database/MVA%
202018,%20Manufacturing;jsessionid=EC9DD71702C0355761B8513264AE3881.
[61] R. Connolly, Russia's Response to Sanctions, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2018.
[62] P.K. Baev, Russia abandons the energy super-power idea buts lacks energy for
‘modernisation’, Strat. Anal. 34 (2010) 885–896 https://doi.org/10.1080/
09700160701415735.
[63] T. Gustafson, Wheel of Fortune: the Battle for Oil and Power in Russia, The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press Cambridge, Mass., 2012.
[64] P. Rutland, Russia as an energy superpower, New Polit. Econ. 13 (2008) 203–210
https://doi.org/10.1080/13563460802018547.
M. Bradshaw, et al. Energy Strategy Reviews 26 (2019) 100374
11
[65] L.-C. Sim, The Rise and Fall of Privatization in the Russian Oil Industry, Palgrave
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008.
[66] S. Hedlund, S. Putin’s, Energy Agenda: the Contradictions of Russia's Resource
Wealth, Lynne Reinner Publishers, London, 2014.
[67] H. Appel, Is it Putin or is it oil? Explaining Russia's fiscal recovery, Post Sov. Aff. 24
(2008) 302–323 https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586X.24.4.301.
[68] R. Connolly, The determinants of the economic crisis in post-socialist Europe, Eur.
Asia Stud. 64 (2012) (2012) 35–56.
[69] S. Guriev, A. Tsyvinski, Challenges facing the Russian economy after the crisis, in:
A. Aslund, S. Guriev, S. Kuchins (Eds.), Russia after the Global Economic Crisis,
Peterson Institute for Internal Economics, Washington, D.C, 2010.
[70] J. Cooper, Russian Military Expenditure: Data, Analysis and Issues, FOI, Defence
Analysis, Stockholm, 2013.
[71] M. Bradshaw, R. Connolly, Bullets and barrels: the geostrategic significance of
Russia's oil and gas exports, Bull. At. Sci. 72 (2016) 156–164.
[72] C. Miller, Putinomics. Power and Money in Resurgent Russia, North Carolina
University Press, Chapel Hill, 2018.
[73] T. Van de Graff, J.D. Cogan, Russian gas games or well-oiled conflict? Energy
Security and the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 24 (2017) 59–64 https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.12.018.
[74] N. Dzis’-Voynarovskii, ‘ZAO “Rossiya” [JSC “Russia”], Novoe Vremya, 13 April
2015, http://www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/97063/ , Accessed date: 2 May
2015.
[75] Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, ‘Mediaforum nezavisimykh
Regional’nykh I Mestnykh SMI’ [Media Forum of Regional and Local Mass Media],
(28 April 2015) http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49358 , Accessed date:
28 November 2015.
[76] A. Topalov, Putin Prodiktoval Kitayu Tsenu, (21 May 2014) [Putin dictated the
price to China], Gazeta.ru http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2014/05/21/6042329.
shtml , Accessed date: 10 May 2019.
[77] H. Foy, R. Toplensky, A. Ward, Gazprom to Receive Funding for Nord Stream 2
Pipeline, Financial Times, 24 April 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/32898bae-
28f3-11e7-9ec8-168383da43b7 , Accessed date: 10 May 2019.
[78] N. Mehdiyeva, When Sanctions Bite: Global Export Leadership in a Competitive
World and Russia's Energy Strategy to 2035, NATO Defence College, Rome,
2017http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1014 , Accessed date: 19
January 2019.
[79] A. Teksler, A. Remarks by the Deputy Minister for Energy vol. 2, (October 2015)
http://minenergo.gov.ru/nod/1367 (Link not live).
[80] A. Vorobyev, ‘Superverf' «Zvezda» Mozhet Vpervyye Poluchit' Subsidii’ [Super
Shipyard ‘Zvezda’ Might Recevie Subsidies for the First Time], Vedomosti, (24
October 2017) https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2017/10/24/739117-
zvezda-subsidii , Accessed date: 10 May 2019.
[81] I. Safranov, ‘Suda Vazhneye Suda’ [Ships Are More Important than Court]
Kommersant, (17 November 2017) https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3468887 ,
Accessed date: 10 May 2019.
[82] V. Petlevoi, ‘Verf' «Zvezda» Mozhet Pereyti S Zarubezhnoy Stali Na Rossiyskuyu,’
[The Zvezda Shipyard Might Go over to Foreign Steel], (17 February 2019)
Vedomosti https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2019/02/17/794352-
verf-zvezda , Accessed date: 10 May 2019.
[83] A. Vorobyev, ‘Chinovniki Khotyat Kontrolirovat' Zakazy Goskompaniy Na
Inostrannykh Verfyakh,’ [Officials Want to Regulate the Orders of State Companies
at Foreign Shipyards], Vedomosti, (3 April 2016) https://www.vedomosti.ru/
business/articles/2016/04/03/636228-kontrolirovat-zakazi-goskompanii ,
Accessed date: 10 May 2019.
[84] Rosatom, Rosatom Issues 2017 Annual Report, Press release, 13 August 2018,
https://rosatom-europe.com/en/press-centre/news/rosatom-issues-2017-annual-
report/ , Accessed date: 10 May 2019.
[85] Government of the Russian Federation, Energeticheskaya Strategiya Rossii Na
Period Do 2030 Goda, (2009), p. 4 [Energy strategy of Russia to 2030], English
version available at: http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_(Eng).
pdf , Accessed date: 10 May 2019.
[86] N. Otsuka, T. Tamura, M. Fuiruichi, Northern Sea Route (NSR) shipping, current
status, and feasibility, in: V.-P. Tynkkyne, S. Tabata, D. Gritsenko, M. Goto (Eds.),
Russia's Far North. The Contested Energy Frontier, Routledge Press, London, 2019.
[87] A. Monaghan, Russian State Mobilization Moving the Country on to a War Footing,
Chatham House, London, 2016.
[88] O. Stuenkel, Post-western World, (2016) London: Polity, Cambridge.
[89] J. Henderson, The leaders of Russia's energy pivot to Asia, The Emerging Russia-
Asia Energy Nexus, NBR Special Report # 74, The National Bureau of Asian
Research, Seattle, 2018, pp. 1–16 https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-emerging-
russia-asia-energy-nexus/ , Accessed date: 17 January 2019.
[90] D. Trenin, What is Russia up to in the Middle East? Polity, (2017) Cambridge.
[91] M. Bazilian, M. Bradshaw, A. Goldthau, K. Westphal, How the Energy Transition
will reshape gepolitics, Nature 569 (2 May 2019) 29–31 https://www.nature.com/
magazine-assets/d41586-019-01312-5/d41586-019-01312-5.pdf , Accessed date:
10 May 2019.
[92] A. Goldthau, K. Westphal, Why the global energy transition does not mean the end
of the petrostate, Glob. Policy 10 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.
12649.
M. Bradshaw, et al. Energy Strategy Reviews 26 (2019) 100374
12
